Criticality analysis for a uranium storage facility by Correia, Michelle
  
 
 
CRITICALITY ANALYSIS FOR A URANIUM 
STORAGE FACILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
Michelle Correia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A research report submitted to the Faculty of Science, University of the 
Witwatersrand, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master 
of Science. 
 
School of Physics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Johannesburg, 2015 
 ii 
DECLARATION 
I declare that this research report is my own, unaided work.  It is being submitted 
for the Degree of Master of Science in the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg.  It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in 
any other university.  
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
Michelle Correia 
 
 
 
March 2015 
 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
Protection against accidental criticality is of utmost importance due to the 
potential of extremely high doses (such as the 17 Sv in the case of the Toikamura 
accident) to personnel involved in a criticality accident.   
In this study a criticality study is performed on a storage facility for uranium-
containing residue.  A criticality safety evaluation is the method used to determine 
the criticality safety of a system.  Various internationally accepted methods exist 
which can be used during a criticality safety evaluation, including the use of a 
validated calculational technique.   
The three-dimensional Monte Carlo code, MCNP, was used in this study to 
determine multiplication factors, keff, for several different theoretical storage 
configurations.  The internationally accepted subcritical limit of keff = 0.95 was 
used to determine whether a specific configuration is safe in terms of criticality. 
This study determines whether the theoretical storage configurations will be safe 
in terms of criticality, and it also evaluates the influence of various moderators on 
the multiplication factor, as well as the effect of distance between individual 
canisters on the multiplication factor.  
This criticality safety evaluation aims to show that the proposed theoretical 
storage configurations are safe in terms of criticality.  It also provides 
recommendations of how the storage capacity can be increased, based on the 
results of the study. 
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GLOSSARY  
 
Criticality Accident “The release of energy as the result of 
accidentally producing a self-sustaining fission 
chain reaction” [MCL00]. 
Criticality Safety Evaluation “The analysis and documentation that the fissile 
material covered by the scope of the evaluation 
will remain subcritical under both normal and 
credible abnormal conditions” [DOE07]. 
Fission products “Nuclides produced by fission of by subsequent 
radioactive decay of nuclides formed in this 
manner” [MCL00]. 
High Enriched Uranium 
(HEU) 
Uranium enriched to at least 20% 
235
U by weight. 
Low Enriched Uranium 
(LEU) 
Uranium enriched up to 19.999% 
235
U by weight. 
Proliferation The spread of biological, chemical and/or nuclear 
weapons, and their delivery systems. 
Subcritical limit “The limited value assigned to controlled 
parameter that results in a system known to be 
subcritical” [ANS75]. 
Thermal energy The energy level at which neutrons are in 
equilibrium with the thermal motion of 
surrounding materials. 
Thermal neutron Neutrons with very low kinetic energy levels 
because they are in equilibrium with the thermal 
motion of surrounding materials. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The word “nuclear” often brings to mind visions of exploding bombs and the 
resulting mushroom clouds.  However, most of the general public is totally 
oblivious to the difference “nuclear” makes daily in the lives of many patients 
undergoing life-saving diagnostic or therapeutic procedures in the field of nuclear 
medicine.  As such NTP Radioisotopes SOC Ltd (a subsidiary of Necsa) has 
evolved into a very important global player in the nuclear medicine business.  The 
most important isotope they produce is Molybdenum-99, 
99
Mo.  This is used as 
the “parent” in a generator that results, after decay, in Technetium-99m, 99mTc.   
The 
99m
Tc is used mostly for bone scans, but is also used to assess cardiac 
function and for functional brain imaging.  Other uses include imaging of the 
liver, kidney, gall bladder and various other organs. 
The radioisotope 
99m
Tc is the one most widely used in medicine, employed in 
approximately 80% of all nuclear medicine procedures - 70 000 every day in the 
USA alone [SNM08].  It is a metastable nuclear isomer of 
99
Tc and it has almost 
ideal characteristics for a nuclear medicine scan, amongst which are:  
 it has a short half-life of six hours, which allows sufficient time for 
scanning procedures, yet it is short enough to keep the radiation exposure 
to the patient low;  
 99mTc decays by emitting γ- rays with a characteristic energy of 140 keV 
and since there is no high-energy β- emission, the radiation dose to the 
patient is low and 
 the low energy γ- rays it emits easily escape the human body and are easily 
detected by a γ-ray camera, minimising the radiation dose to the patient. 
2 
There are, however, certain risks involved with the production of 
99
Mo.  One of 
which is the risk of inadvertent criticality, the other the perceived proliferation 
risk. 
 
1.1 Criticality accidents and the need for safety assessments 
A criticality accident occurs when sufficient fissile material to sustain a nuclear 
chain reaction is unintentionally brought together.  For example, when the nucleus 
of 
235
Uranium splits, two or three neutrons are released, and each can cause 
another nucleus to split.  However, if the total mass of the 
235
U is insufficient to 
sustain a chain reaction, the neutrons simply escape. 
There are two different types of criticality accidents: process accidents and 
research reactor accidents.   
In non-reactor nuclear facilities, administrative or engineered controls are usually 
in place to prevent criticality from occurring, but fail (process accidents).  In 
research reactor accidents, criticality is achieved intentionally, under conditions 
that are strictly controlled, but it ends up getting out of control [MCL00]. 
[MCL00] studied 60 reported criticality accidents since 1945.  Although most of 
these accidents did not lead to fatalities, there have been 21 deaths from criticality 
accidents.  Nine of these fatalities resulted from accidents in non-reactor nuclear 
facilities, and 12 were due to research reactor accidents.  
On 17 June 1997 a criticality accident occurred at the Russian Federal Nuclear 
Centre (formerly known as Arzamas-16) in the town of Sarov.  The accident 
happened while an experienced technician was busy with routine work on a 
critical assembly.  The accident was immediately recognised and the victim 
received prompt medical attention, but he died 66 hours later [IAE01]. 
On 30 September 1999 a criticality accident occurred at the Tokai nuclear fuel 
plant in Tokaimura, Japan.  The accident happened while three workers were 
preparing a batch of fuel.  The chain reaction continued intermittently for 
3 
approximately 20 hours.  The workers were exposed to doses of up to 17 Sv, 
causing severe radiation sickness.  The worker exposed to the highest dose died 
12 weeks later.  The worker exposed to the second highest dose of 6 - 10 Sv died 
another 7 months later.  The plant’s operating licence was revoked early in 2000 
[HOR09]. 
World-wide the occurrence of nuclear criticality accidents has caused processing 
and manufacturing facilities to be out of operation for extended periods of time for 
investigation purposes.  In some instances, the affected facilities have never 
returned to production. 
Criticality accidents, such as those mentioned above, can put a country’s entire 
nuclear enterprise under scrutiny. 
 
1.2 Molybdenum production 
The first step in the production of 
99
Mo is irradiating the enriched uranium target 
plates in a high neutron flux nuclear reactor, such as the 20 MW Oak Ridge-type 
SAFARI-1 reactor at Necsa.  The resulting fission products are a number of 
radionuclides of different half-lives and energies, including the radioisotope of 
interest (in this case 
99
Mo).   
The irradiated target plates are then transferred to a hot cell for further processing 
in order to separate the isotope of interest.  The target plates containing fission-
products are dissolved, which effects separation of the fission products into two 
streams, the 
99
Mo- and (enriched) U-streams.  The uranium residue from the 
production is then stored in a dedicated storage hot cell. 
 
1.3 Hot cell 
A hot cell is specially designed to minimise radiation exposure and to prevent the 
uncontrolled spread of radioactive contamination.  The word “hot” refers to 
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radioactive.  The main design objective for a hot cell is to provide and maintain 
confinement and shielding.  
Since the viewing of operations within the hot cell is necessary, hot cell design 
includes the use of leaded glass shield-windows.  The window should provide the 
same attenuation as the other parts of the hot cell shielding.  Windows are sized 
and installed to give wide ranges of view through the cell, although optical 
distortion may occur at extreme viewing angles.  Figure 1.1 shows a series of hot 
cells, each equipped with a viewing window and two remote manipulators. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Highly shielded hot cells for extremely high activities (source: 
https://inlportal.inl.gov/portal/server.pt/community/materials_chara
cterization/698/hot_cells/8075).   
 
 
Hot cells are equipped with remote handling master-slave manipulators for 
processing radioactive materials as shown in Figure 1.1.  The application of hot 
cells is based on the principle that radiation protection is the cheapest and most 
effective if the shielding is closest to the radiation source [IAE04]. 
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Hot cells are generally made of stainless steel or ordinary mild steel covered by a 
good-quality epoxy resin paint (containment box).  Operations are carried out 
through one of the larger faces by using manipulators.  Hot cells have to be 
shielded against gamma radiation.  Various types of shielding material can be 
used, such as concrete, lead, lead-glass and depleted uranium.  The thickness of 
the shielding is calculated based on the type, energy and activity of the radiation 
in order to keep doses to the operating personnel As Low As Reasonably 
Achievable (ALARA). 
The rear of the cell is fitted with a door through which products, waste and 
consumables can enter/exit the cell.  A transfer system, such as the Padirac by 
Getinge La Calhène, can be used to move items into or out of the cell without 
breaking the containment and with full protection against radiation (see Figure 
1.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Rear side of a hot cell with a Padirac fitted to the cell door (source: 
http://www.getinge.com/nuclear/). 
 
 
The hot cells also need to maintain negative pressure to prevent radioactive 
contamination escaping to the environment.  The hot cell should be leak tight.  
Ventilation is used to prove dynamic containment in addition to the static 
containment provided by the containment box.  A system of dynamic containment 
is where an area with higher contamination levels is kept at a lower pressure than 
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their surroundings.  Air from a volume, therefore, always has a tendency to flow 
towards a volume with higher contamination levels, thus preventing the spread of 
airborne contamination to less contaminated volumes.  The inlet air and the 
exhausted air should pass through HEPA (High Efficiency PArticulate) filters to 
prevent the introduction of dirt and exhaust of any contaminated particles. 
   
1.4 Conversion from HEU to LEU target plates 
In 2007, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) 
have launched the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN).  
The goal of ICAN is to “reawaken public concern about the growing threat posed 
by nuclear weapons, and to mobilize civil society to demand a nuclear-weapon-
free world through the negotiation and adoption of a Nuclear Weapons 
Convention”. [WIL07]. 
IPPNW doctors have written about HEU:  “How many doctors are aware that 
they contribute to a nuclear proliferation and terrorist risk every time they order a 
nuclear bone or lung scan, or other procedure utilising an isotope produced using 
HEU, directly usable in a nuclear weapon?  Almost certainly very few.  How 
many of the patients involved are aware of this?  Probably even fewer.” [WIL07]. 
Although statements such as the above are usually made to shock the public, it is 
very successful in affecting the layman’s opinion about the nuclear industry 
negatively.  The concerns over nuclear weapons proliferation have also led a drive 
to reduce and eliminate international commerce in HEU. 
The majority of the radioisotopes used in diagnostic medical procedures are 
currently produced using HEU.  The major competitors in the international 
medical isotope marketplace (as shown in Figure 1.3) provide more than 95% of 
the global supply, from only five different reactors: Canada’s NRU, the 
Netherlands’ HFR, Belgium’s BR-2, France’s Osiris and South Africa’s SAFARI-
1.  Australia’s Opal reactor, which started up in 2007, has the capacity to produce 
up to half the world’s 99mTc demand but at present has only a small molybdenum 
processing facility and supplies only domestic demand. 
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In July 2005, the South African Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) 
authorised the conversion to LEU of the South African Research Reactor 
(SAFARI-1) and the associated fuel manufacturing at Pelindaba [PIA06].  In 
2008, SAFARI-1 has successfully been converted to LEU fuel, and NTP is in the 
process of converting to LEU target plates although they are currently using both 
HEU and LEU target plates. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Major 
99
Mo producers around the world (source: 
www.nature.com/news/2009/090715/full/460312a.html). 
 
The decision to convert from HEU to LEU target plates for molybdenum 
production was motivated based on two considerations.  The first is based on the 
international initiatives, such as the US Global Threat Reduction Initiative and 
Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Programme, to 
reduce and eventually remove international commerce in HEU.  These initiatives 
are widely supported internationally and acceptable methods are being developed 
by various institutions for the production of 
99
Mo using such target plates. 
A second reason for converting is based on the fact that uranium enrichment 
activities were stopped in South Africa in the early 1990s and given the 
complexities of international procurement, Necsa and NTP will have to revert to 
alternative materials for the fuelling of SAFARI-1 and its target plate 
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requirements.  SAFARI-1 has successfully been using LEU fuel since 2009, and 
NTP is currently in the process of converting to LEU target plates. 
 
1.5 Evaluating the design for use with LEU target plates 
In order to design a storage facility for uranium containing residue, a few 
important factors need to be taken into consideration.  The first two aspects, 
shielding and confinement, are achieved by using a hot cell.  The third important 
function is criticality prevention.  With the change-over from HEU target plates to 
LEU target plates, the volume required for storage is increased, because of the 
lower enrichment grade.  Since the total amount of uranium will increase with the 
lower enrichment grade, the storage capacity will fill up much faster. 
The purpose of this Criticality Safety Evaluation is to provide input into the 
design of the storage facility, and to determine a first order estimation of the 
amount of residue canisters that can be safely stored in the storage hot cell. 
 
1.6 Nuclear Security 
[BRO10] describes the three-part strategy President Obama presented in April 
2009 in order to address international nuclear threats.  This strategy entails: 
 “proposing measures to reduce and eventually eliminate existing nuclear 
weapon arsenals”;  
 “strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)”; and 
 “preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or materials”. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has developed four potential 
nuclear security risk categories [BRO10], namely: 
 “theft of a nuclear weapon”; 
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 “the acquisition of nuclear materials for the construction of nuclear 
explosive devices”; 
 “the malicious use of radioactive sources, including in so-called dirty 
bombs”; and 
 “the radiological hazards caused by an attack on or sabotage of a facility 
or transport vehicle”. 
The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) has been established as global summit with 
the objective of preventing nuclear terrorism around the word.  The first summit 
was held in Washington, D.C. in 2010.   
The 2014 Nuclear Security Summit will be the third and will be attended by a 
South African delegation.    
The Department of International Relations and Cooperation said “South Africa's 
participation in the NSS process is informed by the shared vision of a world free 
of weapons of mass destruction, and in particular nuclear weapons.  The 2014 
Nuclear Security Summit takes place within this broader framework of South 
Africa's triple objectives of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” [DIR14]. 
In the interest of South Africa’s commitment to nuclear security, this report will 
give no details of the storage location, enrichment grade, mass of uranium or 
residue composition.  In addition, the theoretical storage configuration will be 
modelled. 
 
1.7 Proposed methodology for the Criticality Safety Evaluation 
In order to establish that a proposed system or process will be subcritical under 
normal operating conditions and under postulated abnormal conditions, it is first 
necessary to establish acceptable subcritical values for the operation and then 
show that the proposed operation will not exceed those values. 
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There are currently four acceptable methods for the establishment of these values 
[DOE07]: 
 “by reference to national standards that present Subcritical Limits; 
 by reference to widely accepted handbooks of Subcritical Limits; 
 by reference to experiments with appropriate adjustments to ensure 
subcriticality when the uncertainties of parameters reported in the 
experiment documentation are considered; and 
 by validated calculational techniques”. 
Examples of calculational methods are:  
 a Monte Carlo code, such as MCNP, 
 transport theory codes, such as ANISN and 
 hand calculations. 
Due to the limited criticality data in the intermediate enrichment range (~6% to 
~93% 
235
U) from which subcritical limits for criticality control can be deduced, 
the chosen method for the present study is the use of a calculational technique.  
More specifically, the Monte Carlo code MCNPX 2.6.0 will be used for all 
calculations [RSI08].   
 
1.8 Research Report structure and chapter outline 
The layout of this Research Report is as follows: 
 Chapter 2 describes the theoretical considerations applicable to nuclear 
criticality events and nuclear criticality safety, 
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 Chapter 3 gives more detail on the MCNP model built specifically for the 
criticality safety evaluation and also includes a presentation of the results, 
while 
 Chapter 4 presents the conclusions and recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 2 – THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Of all the potential radiation hazards with which a Radiation Protection Specialist 
deals, that of an accidental supercriticality is among the most serious according to 
Cember [CEM96].   
In this chapter the theoretical considerations applicable to nuclear criticality 
events and nuclear criticality safety is addressed.  It includes concepts such as 
nuclear interactions, nuclear fission, criticality principles, the nuclear fission chain 
reaction, criticality control, control principles, anomalies of criticality and the 
MCNP code. 
 
2.1 Nuclear interactions 
Neutrons are electrically neutral and are not affected by the electrons in an atom 
or the positive charge of a nucleus.  Therefore, a neutron passes through the 
electron cloud of an atom and interacts directly with the nucleus.  The different 
interactions that a neutron can have with a nucleus are described below. 
2.1.1 Scattering 
A neutron scattering reaction occurs when a neutron collides with a nucleus, and 
emits a single neutron.  Usually the incident neutron and scattered neutron are not 
the same, but the net effect of the reaction is as if the projectile neutron had 
merely scattered from the nucleus.  The two categories of scattering reactions, 
elastic and inelastic scattering, are described in the following paragraphs. 
2.1.1.1 Elastic scattering 
In an elastic scattering reaction between a neutron and a target nucleus, kinetic 
energy and momentum are conserved.  This type of reaction is often described as 
a “billiard ball” type reaction.  Elastic scattering is the most likely interaction 
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between fast neutrons (energy of up to 1 MeV) and low-atomic numbered 
absorbers (such as water and carbon).  This interaction is denoted by (n, n). 
2.1.1.2 Inelastic scattering 
In inelastic scattering, the incident neutron is captured by the nucleus, forming a 
compound nucleus.  The kinetic energy of the neutron is transferred to the 
nucleus, leaving the nucleus in an excited state, and emitting a neutron of lower 
kinetic energy.  The excited nucleus is de-exited by emitting one or more γ-rays.  
Generally the energy at which the first excited state is found decreases with 
increasing mass number.  This reaction is abbreviated by the symbol (n, n'). 
2.1.2 Absorption reactions 
When the interaction of a neutron with a nucleus results in the loss of the neutron, 
it is known as an absorption reaction. The original neutron is absorbed by the 
nucleus and a charged particle or γ-ray is emitted.  Radiative capture, charged-
particle reactions, and fission are all absorption reactions and are described in the 
paragraphs below. 
2.1.2.1 Radiative capture 
In radiative capture the incident neutron is absorbed by the target nucleus forming 
a compound nucleus.  The excited compound nucleus then decays to its ground 
state by emitting γ-rays.  This interaction is denoted by (n, γ).  These reactions can 
take place at all neutron energies. 
2.1.2.2 Charged-particle reactions 
In this type of reaction, the incident neutron is absorbed by the target nucleus 
forming a compound nucleus.  The compound nucleus is excited to a high energy 
level causing it to emit a charged particle.  Such reactions can be abbreviated by 
(n, α), (n, p) and (n, 2n).  The cross-sections for these reactions usually have 
threshold energies from 5 to 10 MeV. 
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2.1.2.3 Fission 
When a neutron collides with certain nuclei, the nucleus absorbs the neutron and 
splits into two similarly sized parts. Fission will be discussed in more detail in the 
next paragraph. 
 
2.2 Nuclear fission 
The fission process is often described by considering the nucleus as a liquid drop.  
In the liquid drop model, it is assumed that nuclear forces hold the nucleus 
together in the same way that a drop of water is held together by the molecular 
forces that tend to make the drop spherical in shape.     
The liquid drop model for fission is illustrated in Figure 2.1.  The nucleus in the 
ground state is represented as a sphere or a liquid drop (A).  When an incident 
neutron is absorbed by the target nucleus, a compound nucleus is formed.   
The energy imparted on the compound nucleus causes the sphere to become 
distorted, and, under certain conditions, to become dumbbell-shaped (B).  If given 
sufficient energy, the dumbbell shape splits at the neck into two similar sized 
fragments (C) and several neutrons.   
 
Figure 2.1: Liquid Drop Model of fission [DOE93]. 
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Figure 2.2: Thermal neutron fission yield of 
235
U as a function of mass number 
[www.science.uwwarerloo.ca/~cchieh/cact/nuctek/fissionyield.html]. 
 
One would expect that a fissioning nucleus should split more or less in half 
[LAM01].  However, fission is usually asymmetric with fission products falling 
into two definite groups, one light group with mass number of around 95u and a 
heavy group with mass number of around 140u.  A uranium nucleus can split in 
many ways, yielding over 80 primary fission products.  Mass numbers of the 
fission products vary between 72 (Zn) and 160 (Tb).  This is illustrated by Figure 
2.2 which shows the fission yield as a function of mass number. 
2.3 The fission chain reaction 
According to Cember [CEM96] “criticality may be defined as the attainment of 
physical conditions such that a fissile material will sustain a chain reaction”.   
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According to Lamarsh [LAM01], a fission chain reaction (see Figure 2.3) happens 
when “neutrons emitted by fissioning nuclei induce fissions in other fissile or 
fissionable nuclei; the neutrons from these fissions induce fissions in still other 
fissile or fissionable nuclei; and so on”.  
 
Figure 2.3: The fission chain reaction 
[http://www.jaymaron.com/nuclear/nuclear.html]. 
 
2.3.1 The multiplication factor 
Not all of the neutrons produced by fission will cause new fissions.  Some 
neutrons will be absorbed without causing fission, and some will leak out of the 
system.  In order to maintain a chain reaction, each nucleus that is split, should 
produce at least one neutron that causes another fission.  This ratio is expressed in 
terms of a multiplication factor: 
        
                                    
                                              
   (2.1) 
Alternatively, 
        
                       
                 
      (2.2) 
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When keff is greater than 1, the system is described as supercritical.  The number 
of fissions increases with time, because the rate of neutron production is greater 
than the rate at which neutrons are absorbed or leak out of the system.   
When keff is less than 1, the system is described as subcritical.  The number of 
fissions decreases from generation to generation, because the rate of neutron 
absorption and leakage is greater than the rate of neutron production.   
When keff is equal to 1, the chain reaction proceeds at a constant rate, because the 
rate of neutron production is equal to the rate of neutron absorption and leakage.  
Such a system is said to be critical. 
The value of keff can be seen as an index of criticality.  The internationally 
accepted limit to ensure that a system remains subcritical is keff  ≤ 0.95 [VEN03]. 
In a nuclear reactor, the system is designed to obtain a chain reaction in a 
controlled manner.  However, outside of a nuclear reactor one would want the 
system to remain subcritical.  Criticality outside of a nuclear reactor is an accident 
situation, since it would be uncontrolled.  It is caused by the building up of 
enough fissile material to cause a nuclear chain reaction. 
 
2.4 Criticality Principles  
Meggitt [MEG06] describes the fission process in some detail.  When a uranium 
nucleus fissions, an average of 2.4 neutrons are emitted with an average energy of 
2 MeV.  There is one of three things that could happen with each neutron: 
 it can collide with a nucleus through inelastic scattering, 
 it can be absorbed by  a nucleus or  
 it can cause another fission. 
With natural uranium, about 80% of neutrons will cause inelastic scattering with a 
238
U nucleus.  Almost all of the other neutrons will cause fission events in 
238
U 
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with only approximately 0.3% causing fission events in 
235
U.  These fission events 
will not produce enough neutrons to sustain a chain reaction.  The emitted 
neutrons will lose a substantial portion of their energy and most of these neutrons 
will cause further inelastic collisions. Neutron-induced fission of 
238
U will not 
happen because the neutron energy is now below the threshold for fission of 
238
U.  
The fission cross-section for 
238
U only becomes appreciable at energies in excess 
of 1.3 MeV.   
About 15% of the neutrons will now cause 
235
U fission events.  This is still not 
enough fission events to sustain a chain reaction, and the dominant effect is that 
the neutron continues to lose its energy by inelastic scattering collisions.  When 
the energy falls below 1 keV, most of the neutrons are absorbed by the 
238
U 
nucleus (radiative capture).  The few neutrons that do escape capture, reach an 
energy region where 
238
U fission is the most likely fate.  Due to the small amount 
of 
235
U, a chain reaction can, however, not be sustained.   
If the uranium is enriched, the probability of 
235
U fission becomes equal to that of 
the inelastic scattering, and sustainability of a chain reaction now becomes a 
possibility. 
When neutrons collide with moderators, they lose a high proportion of their 
energy in each collision.  The energy falls until it is similar to the thermal energy 
of the nuclei of the moderator.  In this region the probability of fission of 
235
U is at 
its highest and a chain reaction becomes possible (even with natural uranium).  
Moderators are always a low-mass-number material with low neutron absorption 
characteristics and a high scattering cross-section [LAM01].  Common materials 
present in facilities that could cause moderation (even though not their primary 
function) are: water, oil, polythene, carbon and paint. 
 
2.5 Criticality Control 
Nuclear criticality safety has been defined as “the prevention or termination of 
inadvertent nuclear chain reactions in non-reactor environments” [ANS75].   
19 
It has also been defined as the “art of avoiding a nuclear excursion” by Paxton 
[PAX72].
 
Another definition states that criticality safety may be considered “protection 
against the consequences of a nuclear excursion” [PAX72], or “protection against 
the consequences of an inadvertent nuclear chain reaction, preferably by 
prevention of the chain reaction” [ANS83].  
Out of the above, it is clear that prevention of criticality in a non-reactor scenario 
is the ultimate goal.  The use of the word “art” also shows that criticality 
prevention is not totally scientific.  Criticality is highly dependent on human 
factors, i.e. the actions by operators and supervisors.  The definitions also show 
the importance of proper design to provide sufficient mitigation of the 
consequences of a criticality excursion. 
2.5.1 Factors that affect criticality 
It is possible to control the neutron economy of a system containing fissile 
material.  The factors that allow for control of the neutron economy are listed and 
discussed below [WIL96]. 
2.5.1.1 Geometry 
The shape of systems containing fissile material can be designed so that the 
likelihood of collisions is significantly reduced.   
For example, a system may be required for operational reasons to be a flat slab.  
The slab can be made sufficiently thin so that it makes no difference how much 
fissile material is present in the system.  A sufficient fraction of neutrons will 
escape and a criticality cannot occur.  The same amount of fissile material is 
therefore safer in a shape with a large surface area (such as a slab) than in a small 
compact shape such as a cube or a sphere.   
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Figure 2.4 shows how fewer neutrons are available for fission in the “flat” 
geometry than in the cube geometry, resulting in a lower keff. 
 
Figure 2.4: How geometry can influence neutron leakage [source: internal 
Necsa training presentation]. 
 
2.5.1.2 Mass 
If there are only a few fissile atoms in a given location, most of the neutrons from 
those which undergo fission would be able to escape the system.  If there is a 
significant mass of fissile material, then a neutron will have a high probability of 
being captured and causing fission (see Figure 2.5).  The minimum mass at which 
a criticality can occur is called the “critical mass”. 
 
Figure 2.5: An increased mass favours the production of neutrons [source: 
internal Necsa training presentation]. 
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2.5.1.3 Density 
It follows from the discussion of mass that the density of nuclei is important (this 
refers to uranium density and not material density).  The closer packed the nuclei 
are, the greater the likelihood of collisions with the neutrons and, therefore, the 
higher the potential to sustain a chain reaction. 
2.5.1.4 Interaction 
Fissile material in one container cannot distinguish between neutrons generated 
within it and neutrons generated in another container of fissile material.  Storage 
of two or more containers of fissile material in close proximity of each other can, 
therefore, increase the probability of a criticality occurring, as shown in Figure 
2.6.   
 
Figure 2.6: How storage in close proximity to each other can cause criticality 
[source: internal Necsa training presentation]. 
 
 
By way of example, vessels can be designed with spacer rings in order to reduce 
interaction with other vessels as shown in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7: A container designed to keep a safe distance from another 
container [source: photo obtained from a colleague who visited 
Springfields Fuel Ltd.]. 
 
2.5.1.5 Moderation 
Neutrons which move relatively slowly through fissile material have a greater 
fission cross section (such as 583 barn for 
235
U) than neutrons that are moving 
more rapidly (such as 1 barn for 
235
U).  The slowing down of neutrons is known as 
moderation and is used to produce controlled criticality in nuclear reactors.  The 
simplest method of slowing neutrons down is to increase the potential for them to 
strike non-fissile and non-absorbing nuclei with a small atomic mass.  Such 
collisions may be regarded as elastic scattering impacts between spheres, and the 
nearer the masses of the colliding spheres, the more effective is the transfer of 
momentum.  It follows that the most effective nuclei in slowing neutrons down 
are the lighter ones, such as hydrogen.  This is why water is considered to be one 
of the most dangerous substances to associate with fissile material without due 
precautions. 
23 
Figure 2.8 shows an example of how a storage area can be designed to limit 
possible moderation.  The following precautions are taken – there are no water or 
steam lines in the area, fire fighting with water is not permitted, drums are lidded 
and branded, drums are off the floor and the roof is watertight. 
 
Figure 2.8: A moderation safe storage area for canisters containing fissile 
material [Source: photo obtained from a colleague who visited 
Springfields Fuel Ltd.]. 
 
Other common moderating materials are oil, polyethylene, carbon and paint. 
2.5.1.6 Concentration 
Even where fissile material is dispersed in a moderator (e.g. dissolved in water) it 
is possible for the concentration of the fissile material to be so low that criticality 
is not possible, because the neutrons are more likely to be captured by non-fissile 
than by fissile material. 
2.5.1.7 Poisons 
A poison, in the context of criticality control, is a material that absorbs neutrons, 
thus reducing its chance of colliding with fissile nuclei.  Criticality can, therefore, 
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be controlled by mixing poisons with the fissile material.  The most effective 
poisons are considered to be boron and cadmium. 
2.5.1.8 Reflection 
If a moderating material is placed around a piece of fissile material, some of the 
neutrons that would have escaped will be reflected back into the fissile material.  
This process is called reflection.  The effect is similar to that of interaction.  The 
properties that make a material a good moderator also make for a good reflector.  
However, a good reflector is not necessarily a good moderator (e.g., iron is a good 
reflector but also a poison).  Good reflectors are graphite, beryllium, water and 
natural uranium. 
2.5.1.9 Enrichment 
Uranium consists of two main isotopes: 
235
U which is fissile and can cause 
criticality if present in sufficient quantities and 
238
U which is not fissile.  In natural 
uranium there is only about 0.72% 
235
U [LAM01] which makes criticality almost 
impossible, since the mass of 
235
U is very small.  The 
238
U has a variety of 
properties.  It is slightly fissionable and may undergo fission as a result of fast 
(but not slow) neutron absorption.  It may also absorb neutrons without 
undergoing fission.  Hence, the probability of fission resulting from neutron 
capture by 
238
U nuclei tends to be low, especially in unmoderated systems.  
238
U 
also acts as a reflector, as a separator between 
235
U nuclei affecting the fissile 
density of the system, and has some effect as a poison.  When the uranium is 
enriched, the amount of 
235
U is increased and criticality becomes possible. 
2.5.1.10 Inhomogeneity 
A homogeneous system is one where all the nuclides are evenly distributed 
throughout the system (such as in a solution).  An inhomogeneous system is one 
where the fissile material is physically separate from the other parts of the system 
(for example in a reactor where fissile material in the rods is physically separated 
from the moderator).  At a high 
235
U enrichment a homogeneous uranium salt 
solution is more reactive than any comparable inhomogeneous system.  At 
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enrichment close to natural uranium, however, an inhomogeneous system may be 
more reactive than a comparable homogeneous one. 
2.5.2 Control principles  
It is generally accepted that nuclear safety should depend as little as possible on 
decisions and actions of operating personnel, especially for routine operations.  
The [ANS83] recommends that, where practicable, criticality control be based on 
limited geometrical size.  Even when geometrical favourable equipment is used, 
care is required to assure maintenance of dimensions. 
When geometrical safe design is not possible, the plant operation is governed by 
the so-called double-contingency principle [DOE92]: 
“Process designs shall incorporate sufficient factors of safety to require at least 
two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions before a 
criticality accident is possible.  Protection shall be provided by either”: 
1. “The control of two independent process parameters (which is the 
preferred approach, if practical)” or 
2. “A system of multiple (at least two) controls on a single parameter”. 
“In all cases, no (credible) single failure shall result in the potential for a 
criticality accident.” 
An example of application of the double contingency principle can be found in the 
fabrication facilities for Light Water Reactor (LWR) fuel.  Since the slightly 
enriched uranium can be critical only if appropriately moderated or reflected, full 
water flooding is the “first contingency” for nearly all analyses.  Then, even if 
flooded, an additional independent change, for example major geometrical 
rearrangement, would be required for criticality under the double contingency 
principle. 
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2.5.3 Criticality data 
Data for criticality safety guidance are distributed through a number of 
publications.  “Critical Dimensions of Systems Containing 235U, 239Pu, and 233U” 
[PAX87] is a convenient source of critical dimensions.  Nuclear Safety Guide 
TID-7016 [THO78] contains and references a substantial amount of general 
information.  ANS-8.1 [ANS83] and LA-3366 (Rev) [PAX72] are both very 
useful references.   
When using data from these publications, it is important to understand the 
limitations of the data.  For example, [ANS83] states:  “This standard is 
applicable to operations with fissionable materials outside nuclear reactors, 
except the assembly of these materials under controlled conditions, such as in 
critical experiments.  Generalised basic criteria are presented and limits are 
specified for some single fissionable units of simple shape containing 
233
U, 
235
U, 
or 
239
Pu, but not for multi-unit arrays. Requirements are stated for establishing 
the validity and areas of applicability of any calculational method used in 
assessing nuclear criticality safety.  This standard does not include the details of 
administrative controls, the design of processes or equipment, the description of 
instrumentation for process control, or detailed criteria to be met in transporting 
fissionable materials.” 
Unfortunately data on the criticality of uranium in the intermediate enrichment 
range (~6% to ~93% 
235
U) from which subcritical limits for criticality control can 
be deduced are limited, and this enrichment range is not adequately covered in 
[ANS83].   
 
2.6 Anomalies of Criticality 
The Oxford dictionary defines an anomaly as “something that deviates from what 
is standard, normal, or expected”.  Since 1943 several anomalies of criticality 
have come to light and have been published in order to add awareness to the 
persons involved with criticality control and prevention [CLA10]. 
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A few examples are given below: 
The cube and the sphere 
It is a well-known expectation that a sphere has the smallest critical volume of any 
shape.  The reason for this being that neutron production depends on volume, and 
neutron leakage on surface area and the ratio of surface area to volume is a 
minimum in the case of a sphere.  Results from experiments have, however, 
indicated that a reflected cube might under certain circumstances have a smaller 
critical volume and mass than if the fissile material were in the shape of a sphere 
[BIE69, BIE71]. 
Added scatterers and moderation 
In some cases the effect of added scatterers can significantly reduce the critical 
dimension, whereas in others the result can be precisely the opposite.  For 
example, when adding water to mixed oxides of Pu and U, the critical volume 
initially decreases.  Once the point of saturation is reached, further addition of 
water actually reduces the density of the mixed oxides and the critical volume 
starts to increase   [CLA10]. 
Fog, mist or flooding: a potential for triple criticality 
This example looks at the effect on criticality of increasing the water content of 
the intervening airspaces within the storage array.  This criticality anomaly is 
caused by the competing effects of increasing water content density between and 
within units.  It looks at an array that is subcritical when totally dry (see Figure 
2.9).   
At first keff increases quite fast with increased water content density due to internal 
moderation, external reflection and enhanced interaction.  A small amount of 
water will typically slow down some neutrons, therefore enhancing the 
interaction.  If the water content is further increased, more neutrons will be 
absorbed between the units, reducing interaction, and therefore lowering keff.   
Then, as the water content density approaches unity, keff increases again. 
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Figure 2.9: Triple potential for criticality induced by increasing water content 
between and within uranium storage units (Author’s own 
representation). 
 
As shown in Figure 2.9, criticality can occur at three different water content 
densities (where keff equals unity), separated by two subcritical regions of water 
content density, when moving from a completely dry condition to fully flooded. 
This problem is particularly of interest for the purpose of this research project.  
The temperature in the hot cell is high due to the decay heat of the residue stored 
in the hot cell and any water present in the hot cell evaporates within several 
hours.  It is, therefore, very possible that water vapour is present in the hot cell at 
a density much lower than that of normal water.  Thus, it is important that the 
safety of a given storage array be examined over the full range of densities that 
may be encountered. 
 
2.7 Radiation transport code MCNP 
The Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code is an internationally recognized code 
for analysing the transport of photons and neutrons.  Applications for MCNP 
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include, but are not limited to, accelerator applications, radiation shielding, and 
nuclear criticality.  The code was developed and is maintained by the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory [SHU07]. 
 
2.7.1 A brief description of the Monte Carlo technique  
In general, any Monte Carlo technique mathematically traces the paths of 
individual neutrons, collision by collision, obeying certain fundamental laws of 
probability.  Although very different in form, the procedure can be shown to be 
equivalent to using a random-sampling technique to evaluate the double integral 
in the Boltzmann equation (as demonstrated by Schaeffer [SCH73] and Carter and 
Cashwell [CAR75]. 
Knief [KNI85] describes the Monte Carlo method in the context of nuclear 
criticality safety as the “tracking of individual (fictitious) neutrons through a 
material medium containing fissile and other species”.  A complete description of 
neutron travel paths accounts for: types and distances between interactions, 
energies and direction of travel, production from fission or other reactions and 
loss by capture of leakage.  It is well known that the outcome of any such event 
cannot be identified beforehand.  Instead, each may be described by a probability 
distribution that quite accurately predicts the composite behaviour of a very large 
number of events.  These “laws” are usually described or otherwise characterised 
by such familiar parameters as reaction cross sections, mean free paths, scattering 
distributions, and energy spectra.  Since the outcome of an event is random, the 
Monte Carlo method makes event selection equivalent to choosing a random 
number.  The overall results of following a number of neutrons through their 
“path of events” in a particular medium provide a reasonable approximation to the 
behaviour of the actual system represented by the model. 
A simplified flow diagram for a multiplication factor calculation is shown in 
Figure 2.10.   
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Figure 2.10: Flow diagram for an analog Monte Carlo method used to calculate 
the effective multiplication factor keff [KNI81]. 
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The procedure, a form of unbiased or analog Monte Carlo, follows generations of 
neutrons and compares the number started to the number produced to calculate 
keff.  In an arbitrary generation, the locations for starting individual neutron 
histories are selected from those of the previous generation, the first generation 
having started neutrons from an arbitrary distribution.  The energy and direction 
are selected randomly from appropriate cumulative distribution functions.  
Neutron path lengths between collisions depend on the total macroscopic cross-
section.  The geometry determines whether a neutron leaks or experiences a 
collision at the end of its path length.  Collision types are selected randomly in 
accordance with the appropriate reaction cross-sections.  Scattering events change 
the energy and direction of the neutron before it continues through the system.  
Leakage, capture and fission terminate the history and signal the start of the next 
fission neutron.  For fission reactions, the number of neutrons is randomly 
selected with the resulting number and the location if the event stored for use in 
starting neutrons of the next generation.  Since it is typical to start with a fixed 
number of neutrons in each generation N, the number of fission points in 
generation N – 1 may be adjusted upward or downward by random duplication or 
elimination, respectively. 
An advantage of Monte Carlo over transport methods is that it is inherently less 
limited by geometry – the computing effort required to track neutron paths is 
relatively insensitive to geometric complexity.  As a result, Monte Carlo can 
handle any geometry, generally as an assemblage of cells such as finite cylinders 
and hemispheres, or combinations thereof, and readily accommodates finite arrays 
of units [KAL68]. 
2.7.2 Criticality calculations with MCNP 
When calculating keff, MCNP estimates the mean number of fission neutrons 
produced in a single generation per fission neutron started.  In MCNP, a fission 
generation is called a keff cycle.  In other word, a cycle is an estimation of an 
actual fission generation, as calculated by MCNP.  Processes such as (n,2n) and 
(n,3n) are considered internal to a cycle and do not act as termination.  Because 
fission neutrons are terminated in each cycle to provide the fission source for the 
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next cycle, a single history can be viewed as continuing from cycle to cycle.  
MCNP uses three different estimators for keff, based on collision, absorption, or 
track length.  Urbatsch et al. [URB95] recommend using, for the final keff result, 
the statistical combination of all three. 
It is extremely important to emphasise that the result from a criticality calculation 
is a confidence interval for keff that is formed using the final estimated keff and the 
estimated standard deviation.   
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CHAPTER 3 – CRITICALITY ANALYSIS FOR STORAGE CELL: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
CRITICALITY ANALYSIS FOR STORAGE CELL: RESULTS 
AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter gives the reader a basic understanding of the MCNP code, by means 
of a simple example.  It also discusses the assumptions made during the present 
study, it gives a description of the configurations modelled and the parameters 
changed, and it gives a summary and discussion of the results obtained. 
 
3.1 Neutron transport evaluation using MCNP illustrated with 
a worked example 
In order to better explain the operation of the code and in preparation for 
understanding the actual model, an example has been chosen that is relatively 
simple, but contains the necessary principles. 
A cylinder representing a residue canister has been defined.  Shown in Figure 3.1 
is a representation of a vertical cut through the residue canister (not to scale).  The 
cylinder is inside a box, representing a 30.0 cm thick water reflection.  The 
horizontal cut is shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
The MCNP code requires dimensions in centimetres as input data.  The residue 
canister is 10.2 cm high, with an outside diameter of 16 cm and the wall thickness 
is 0.1 cm.  The box representing the water is 76 cm long x 76 cm wide and 70.2 
cm high.  
The dimensions of the surfaces are defined in the MCNP input file according to a 
Cartesian coordinate system.  The origin of this axial system can be chosen by the 
user.  In this example, the origin is chosen as the bottom centre of the inside of the 
residue canister.   
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Figure 3.1: Visual representation of the geometry of the MCNP example – side 
view. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Visual representation of the geometry of the MCNP example – top 
view. 
 
35 
3.1.1 MCNP input data card organisation 
An MCNP input file must contain the descriptions of the problem geometry, 
source and materials.  Figure 3.3 shows how the input file is organised [BRE09]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: MCNP input file structure [BRE09]. 
 
The comment character, (“c”), can be used at the beginning of a line.  Everything 
following the comment character is not used by MCNP.  The card name, surface 
number or data card name must begin within the first five characters of a line.  A 
line cannot contain more than 80 characters.   
 
3.1.2 Discussion of the input data set for MCNP example 
The input data set for the MCNP example is shown in Table 3.1. 
 
A line by line explanation of the input data set follows: 
Single residue canister  
 
This is the title of the MCNP run, known as the Title Card.  It contains 
information about the problem being modelled.  The title should be clear enough 
to enable the user to distinguish among different input files and to help identify 
the content of output files. 
Title Card 
Cell Cards 
…………. 
…………. 
Blank Line Delimiter 
Surface Cards 
…………. 
…………. 
Blank Line Delimiter 
Data Cards 
…………. 
…………. 
Blank Line Terminator (optional) 
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Table 3.1: MCNP example input data set. 
  
Single residue canister  
c Cell Cards 
1     1    -0.833  -1     imp:n,p=1   $residue in canister 
2     2    -8.00   -2 +1  imp:n,p=1   $SS-304L canister 
3     3    -1.00   -3 +2  imp:n,p=1   $300 mm water reflection 
4     0               +3  imp:n,p=0   $External void (UmWelt) 
c ===================================================== 
 
c ===================================================== 
c Surface Cards 
1     rcc  0  0   0.0   0  0  10.0   7.9    $Canister inside surface 
2     rcc  0  0  -0.1   0  0  10.1   8.0    $Canister outside surface 
c 
3     rpp  -38 +38  -38  +38   -30.1  +40.1  $300mm water reflection 
c ===================================================== 
 
c ===================================================== 
c Material Cards 
m2     6000    -0.03            $SS-304L 
      14028    -0.55            $SS-304L 
      14029    -0.03            $SS-304L 
      14030    -0.02            $SS-304L 
      15031    -0.02            $SS-304L 
      16000    -0.03            $SS-304L 
      24050    -0.83            $SS-304L 
      24052   -15.920           $SS-304L 
      24053    -1.81            $SS-304L 
      24054    -0.45            $SS-304L 
      25055    -1.70            $SS-304L 
      26054    -3.980           $SS-304L 
      26056   -62.93            $SS-304L 
      26057    -1.47            $SS-304L 
      26058    -0.22            $SS-304L 
      28058    -6.78            $SS-304L 
      28060    -2.64            $SS-304L 
      28061    -0.12            $SS-304L 
      28062    -0.37            $SS-304L 
      28064    -0.10            $SS-304L 
c 
m3     1001    +1.99975         $Water 
       1002    +0.00025         $Water 
       8016    +1               $Water 
c ======================================================= 
c 
c ======================================================= 
ksrc   0 0 4.9 
kcode  1e3    1    20   50      
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For the purposes of this explanation the next two sections are swopped around.  
Cell Cards precede the Surface Cards in the input file, but it is more logical to 
define the surfaces first. 
C Surface Cards 
1     rcc  0  0   0.0   0  0  10.0   7.9     $Canister inside 
surface 
2     rcc  0  0  -0.1   0  0  10.1   8.0     $Canister outside 
surface 
c 
3     rpp  -38 +38  -38  +38   -30.1  +40.1  $300mm water 
reflection 
 
Surface 1 is a right circular cylinder, hence the surface mnemonic “rcc”.  In the 
case of an rcc surface, the x1, y1, and z1 coordinates (coordinates from the bottom 
centre) are defined.  Thereafter the x2, y2 and z2 coordinates are defined relative to 
the origin.  Lastly the radius is given.  The inside surface of the canister (surface 
1) has a height 10 cm and a radius of 7.9 cm. 
Surface 2 is the outside surface of the canister.  The bottom centre has the same x1 
and y1 coordinates as surface 1, but the z1 coordinate is 0.1 cm below that of 
surface 1, because of the wall thickness of 0.1 cm.  This surface has a height of 
10.2 cm and a radius of 8 cm. 
Surface 3 is a rectangular parallelepiped “rpp” with surfaces normal to major axes.  
In the case of an rpp, the x, y and z coordinates are defined in the order xmin, xmax, 
ymin, ymax and zmin, zmax.  Surface 3 represents the 30.0 cm thick water reflection. 
C Cell Cards 
1     1    -0.833  -1     imp:n,p=1   $residue in canister 
2     2    -8.00   -2 +1  imp:n,p=1   $SS-304L canister 
3     3    -1.00   -3 +2  imp:n,p=1   $300 mm water reflection 
4     0               +3  imp:n,p=0   $External void (UmWelt) 
 
Referring to Cell Cards, the number in the first column is the number of the cell.  
The number in the second column is the material number that fills the cell.  The 
number in the third column is the density of the material.  The fourth column is 
reserved for reference to the surface numbers that form the boundaries of the cell.   
The importance (imp) of tracing particles is shown in the fifth column.  The $ sign 
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signifies the beginning of an in-line comment; everything to the right of the $ 
sign, is only a comment. 
Cell 1 is composed of material number 1, which has a density of 0.833 g/cm
3
 
(negative densities mean the quantity is mass-density given in units of g/cm
3
; 
positive densities mean that the unit is given as the number of atoms per barn.cm).  
Cell 1 consists of the volume inside surface 1.  The importance of neutrons (n) 
and photons (p) inside Cell 1, is 1.   
Cell 2 is composed of material number 2, which has a density of 8 g/cm
3
.  Cell 2 
consists of the intersection of all space outside surface 1 and inside surface 2.  
Cell 3 is composed of material number 3, which has a density of 1 g/cm
3
.  Cell 3 
consists of the intersection of all space outside surface 2 and inside surface 3. 
Cell 4 is a void region with zero importance.  The moment a particle enters this 
region, it is not tracked any more by the Monte Carlo code.  The comment term, 
“UmWelt” is a short, descriptive German word that means “environment.”  
By looking at the surface cards, one now understands that cell 1 is the U inside 
cell 2, a cylinder consisting of SS 304-L.  Cell 3 is water that surrounds the 
cylinder.   Cell 4 is all space outside the water reflection.   
Three materials are defined in this input data set. Material 1 is residue, and 
material 2 is SS304-L and material 3 is water.  For the purposes of this report the 
composition of the residue is omitted.  The ZAID (Z-A identity code) of an 
isotope is (1000Z + A).  If a negative number follows the ZAID, it is the mass 
fraction of the material composed of that element.  If a positive number follows 
the ZAID, it designates a number fraction and not a mass fraction.  In the Material 
Card above, the composition of Stainless steel is given as mass fractions and the 
composition of water is given as a number fraction. 
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C Material Cards  
m2     6000    -0.03            $SS-304L 
      14028    -0.55            $SS-304L 
      14029    -0.03            $SS-304L 
      14030    -0.02            $SS-304L 
      15031    -0.02            $SS-304L 
      16000    -0.03            $SS-304L 
      24050    -0.83            $SS-304L 
      24052   -15.920           $SS-304L 
      24053    -1.81            $SS-304L 
      24054    -0.45            $SS-304L 
      25055    -1.70            $SS-304L 
      26054    -3.980           $SS-304L 
      26056   -62.93            $SS-304L 
      26057    -1.47            $SS-304L 
      26058    -0.22            $SS-304L 
      28058    -6.78            $SS-304L 
      28060    -2.64            $SS-304L 
      28061    -0.12            $SS-304L 
      28062    -0.37            $SS-304L 
      28064    -0.10            $SS-304L 
c 
m3     1001    +1.99975         $Water 
       1002    +0.00025         $Water 
       8016    +1               $Water 
 
The “ksrc” card shows the location where the fission source point is placed.  In 
this case, it is near the centre of the residue canister.  The initial “ksrc” source is 
used only for the first keff cycle.  A new spatial fission source is generated during 
each cycle and is used as the source for the next cycle. 
Ksrc   0 0 4.9 
kcode  1e3  1  20  60    
 
 
A “kcode” card is required to run a criticality calculation.  This example will be 
run with 1000 neutrons per cycle.  The initial estimation for keff is 1.0.  
Accumulation of keff data will only start after 20 cycles have been completed, 60 
cycles will be run in total. 
 
3.2 Modelling Assumptions 
3.2.1 Cellulose composition 
Low density waste present in the cell consists of mainly contaminated papers and 
plastics which also have a moderating effect due to its low mass numbers.  For 
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modelling purposes it is simplified as cellulose (11.7% hydrogen, 50% carbon, 
38.3% oxygen).  It is the general composition of cellulose with 8.5% water added.  
The density of the cellulose is varied to determine the effect that the density has 
on criticality. 
3.2.2 Water mist/steam moderation 
In the event of water ingress into the cell, the heat in the cell would rapidly 
vaporise the water, resulting in mist or steam in the cell.  Whenever mist or steam 
is considered, the top (empty) part of the canister is also filled with mist/steam.   
3.2.3 Residue canister geometry 
For simplicity, the residue canister is approximated as a stainless steel cylinder (as 
illustrated in Figure 3.4) with an overall height of 10.2 cm, an outer diameter of 
16.0 cm and 0.1 cm wall thickness.  The container is filled to a height of 9.5 cm 
with residue, while the air gap is 5.0 cm.  The inside top part of the canister is 
always filled with air unless stated otherwise. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Side and top view of a residue canister. 
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3.3 Models 
In this section the two different models are described. 
 
3.3.1 Model 1 
The aim of this model is to determine a maximum storage capacity for the storage 
hot cell.  In order to represent a sphere as closely as possible (the most reactive 
configuration), residue canisters were modelled in different sized “blocks/cubes” 
(Array A, B, C and D).  One configuration representing a slab was also modelled 
(Array E), which is expected to be much less reactive than the configuration 
representing cubes. 
This model is an approximated block of tightly packed residue canisters 
moderated by the hydrogen therein, and reflected by 30.0 cm of water. The 
number of canisters was varied from 360 to 768 residue canisters in five different 
theoretical arrays.  The exact configurations modelled are shown in Table 3.2.  
Figure 3.5 shows the top and side view of Array D respectively.  The side view 
shows the canisters stacked on top of each other. 
The thick red part around the canister in Figure 3.5 represents water and the blue 
represents the material inside the residue canisters.  The green parts between the 
canisters represent air.  The top view shows the 8 x 8 canisters (length x width).  
The side view shows how the 8 x 8 configuration is stacked 12 canisters high. 
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Table 3.2: Arrays in Model 1. 
Array Configuration (length x width x height) 
A 6 x 6 x 10 
B 7 x 7 x 11 
C 7 x 7 x 12 
D 8 x 8 x 12 
E 24 x 10 x 2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Top and side view of Array D as applied in Model 1. 
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3.3.2 Model 2 
This model is similar to Model 1.  Since there is also paper towelling and plastic 
bags present in the hot cell, the effect of cellulose with varying densities (0.024 
g/cm
3
, 0.048 g/cm
3
 and 0.100 g/cm
3
, respectively) as an interstitial moderator was 
determined.   
This model is an approximated block of tightly packed residue canisters with full 
cellulose moderation and 30.0 cm water reflection.  The residue canisters were 
modelled in a 6 x 6 x 13 array.  The spacing between the individual canisters was 
varied from 0 cm to 16 cm in the horizontal direction (x- and y-direction) only.  In 
the z-direction, the canisters remain stacked on top of each other as in Model 1.  
The cellulose was also replaced with water mist/steam to calculate the effect it 
will have on the different geometries.  Figure 3.6 shows the top and side view of 
the 6 x 6 x 13 array, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.6: Top and side view of an array of 6 x 6 x 13 residue canisters placed 
a few centimetres (varied from 0 cm to 16 cm) apart as applied in 
Model 2. 
 
The thick red part around the canisters in Figure 3.6 represents water and the blue 
represents the material inside the residue canisters.  The green parts between the 
canisters represent cellulose. 
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3.4 Modelling Results 
The Monte Carlo code MCNPX 2.6.0 was used on an Intel® Core™ i7 CPU, 2.67 
GHz with 4 GB installed memory (RAM).  A total of 41 runs were performed, 
with an average run time of 8 minutes per run.  However, in order to optimise the 
model, Model 1 went through 14 iterations and Model 2 through 6, adding 
significantly to the total run time before results were obtained. 
Initial programming time for Model 1 was approximately 21 hours, with an 
additional 1 – 2 hours to make the changes for the different arrays.  For Model 2 
an additional 10 minutes were needed to adjust the input file for each data point in 
the model. 
The following is a summary of the results that were obtained from the two models 
ran on MCNP.  The keff, as well as the 2σ value, is obtained from the individual 
MCNP output files. 
 
3.4.1 Model 1 
The results of the five different storage configurations analysed (see Table 3.3) are 
presented in Figure 3.7.   
The reactivity (i.e. keff) increases as the number of residue canisters increase (for 
the selected configurations).  Model 1 analysed 360 residue canisters while Model 
2 analysed 768 residue canisters.  The configuration representing a slab containing 
480 residue canisters has a much lower reactivity than all of the cube 
configurations.  It is noted that all five configurations are subcritical.  However, 
the result for Array D (768 residue canister) is above the internationally accepted 
subcritical limit of keff = 0.95 (indicated by the red line in Figure 3.7). 
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Table 3.3: Model 1 results. 
 
Configuration keff 2σ error (95% confidence) 
Array A (6 x 6 x 10) 0.8820 ±0.0013 
Array B (7 x 7 x 11) 0.9342 ±0.0015 
Array C (7 x 7 x 12) 0.9453 ±0.0012 
Array D (8 x 8 x 12) 0.9825 ±0.0002 
Array E (24 x 10 x 2) 0.5214 ±0.0002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Graphical representation of Model 1 results. 
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3.4.2 Model 2 
Table 3.4 shows the results of the 36 model runs, and Figure 3.8 illustrates the 
effect of interstitial moderator, of varying densities, on the reactivity of the 
configuration modelled.  The x-axis denotes the distance that the canisters are 
apart from each other in vertical columns (stacked on top of each other). The y-
axis denotes the keff.  The legend of Figure 3.8 distinguishes the different densities 
from each other.  The keff decreases as the distance increases for the lower density 
moderators while the 0.100 g/cm
3
 cellulose reaches a peak at 8 cm spacing. 
Table 3.4: Results of the 36 model runs in Model 2. 
Distance 
(cm) 
keff 
Cellulose (moderator) 
Water Mist 
0.024 g/cm
3
 0.048 g/cm
3
 0.100 g/cm
3
 
0 0.92569 0.93964 0.97063 0.91083 
2 0.88839 0.91658 0.97752 0.85642 
4 0.85931 0.90065 0.98477 0.82214 
6 0.83568 0.88478 0.99021 0.78685 
8 0.81412 0.87283 0.9923 0.75616 
10 0.79479 0.8612 0.99076 0.72004 
12 0.77896 0.85027 0.98643 0.69707 
14 0.76158 0.84018 0.97883 0.68251 
16 0.74813 0.82947 0.96741 0.66256 
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Figure 3.8: Graphical representation of Model 2 results. 
 
 
Table 3.5: Maximum keff values for Model 2.  
 
Moderator Max keff 
Distance at 
which the keff 
peaks 
2σ error  
(95% 
confidence) 
Cellulose (0.024 g/cm
3
) 0.9257 0 cm ±0.0005 
Cellulose (0.048 g/cm
3
) 0.9396 0 cm ±0.0010 
Cellulose (0.100 g/cm
3
) 0.9923 8 cm ±0.0023 
Water mist/steam 0.9120 0 cm ±0.0010 
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Table 3.5 shows the maximum keff for each of the moderators modelled, and 
corresponds to the graph in Figure 3.8. 
3.5 Discussion of results 
The internationally accepted subcritical limit of keff = 0.95 allows for uncertainties 
in the calculations and experimental data used in its derivation.  The results of 
Model 1 indicate that the theoretical storage configurations represented by Arrays 
A, B, C and E are acceptable in terms of criticality safety, with the keff below 0.95.  
This equates to a maximum of 588 residue canisters being stored in the storage 
hot cell in a rectangular assembly with no interstitial moderation and full water 
reflection. 
With full homogeneous interstitial cellulose moderation of a density up to 0.048 
g/cm
3
, the configuration in Model 2 remains subcritical when spaced horizontally 
from 0 cm to 16 cm.  For a cellulose density of 0.100 g/cm
3
, keff exceeds the 
subcritical limit but does not reach supercriticality.  Canisters are stored in the 
storage hot cell in a rectangular assembly with interstitial cellulose moderation 
(density < 0.1 g/cm
3
) and full water reflection. 
Water mist or steam calculations show the lowest keff and are, therefore, bound by 
the interstitial cellulose moderator. 
From this study, it is derived that the storage of up to 588 residue canisters will be 
safe in terms of criticality, without placing any restrictions on the exact geometry.  
The number of residue canisters that can be safely stored can, however, be 
increased by introducing a fixed geometry.  There are two ways that this can be 
implemented. 
Firstly – by increasing the surface area to volume ratio of the configuration, the 
reactivity of the system is reduced (as shown in Model 1), since the same amount 
of fissile material is safer in a shape with a large surface area (such as a slab) than 
in a small compact shape (such as a cube or a sphere), because the number of 
neutrons that will escape the system is higher, resulting in a lower keff.  This is 
supported by the theory presented in Section 2.5.1.1. 
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Secondly – by introducing spacing between canisters, the reactivity (keff ) of the 
system is reduced (as shown in Model 2), since the probability of neutrons 
interacting is reduced when the fissile material is spaced further apart.  This is 
supported by the theory (see Section 2.5.1.4).  
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CHAPTER 4 – RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions and recommendations resulting from this study are presented in 
this chapter.   
4.1 Conclusions from the calculations 
The results of the MCNP model predictions are presented in Chapter 3.  From the 
model runs, it is clear that all the array configurations are safe in terms of 
criticality safety, except for Array D.   
 
4.2 Inputs to the design 
From the present study, the following recommendations can be made as inputs 
into the design of the facility. 
When deciding on a maximum capacity for the storage cell, any of the theoretical 
configurations modelled in Array A, Array B and Array C will remain subcritical 
without the need to implement any restrictions on the storage configuration. 
Should the capacity represented by the above arrays be not sufficient, the capacity 
can be increased by: 
1)  increasing the surface area to volume ratio, i.e. move more towards a 
“flatter” configuration such as a slab (Scenario 1); or 
2) increasing the distance between the canisters (Scenario 2). 
In the case of high density moderator, it is clear that there will be a preferred 
spacing between canisters. 
Whether the design team decides to choose 1) or 2) above to increase the capacity, 
additional restrictions (controls) will need to be implemented to ensure that the 
canisters remain in a safe configuration. 
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It is relatively simple to introduce restrictions that will keep the configurations 
safe in term of criticality.  For Scenario 1, the stacking height of the canisters can 
be limited.  For Scenario 2, a prescribed distance between canisters can be 
introduced.  These are, however, administrative controls.  
The biggest concern with administrative controls is that it is entirely dependent on 
the operator, and the probability of non-adherence to the restrictions is relatively 
high. Furthermore, it is also often difficult to detect non-adherence. 
When implementing controls, the order of preference should be: 
 First – Passive Engineered Controls; 
 Second – Active Engineered Controls; 
 Third – Administrative Controls. 
The design team should therefore be advised to rather look at the possibility of 
engineered controls.  Possible engineered controls for the 2 different scenarios are 
described below. 
 
Scenario 1: 
The surface area to volume ratio of the configuration can be increased by 
decreasing the height of the arrays.  This can be done, for example, by not 
allowing any stacking of the canisters.  By modifying the lid design, the canister 
can be manufactured such that it is impossible to stack canisters on top of each 
other (Passive Engineered Control).  The disadvantage of prohibiting any stacking 
is that the area (floor space) required for storage can increase significantly. 
 
Scenario 2:  
The distance required between canisters can be fixed by, for example, introducing 
a floor grid which will prevent the operator from placing canisters closer to each 
other than the required distance (Passive Engineered Control). 
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Recommendations: 
Based on the finding of this report, the recommendation to the design team is to 
implement a combination of Scenario 1 and Scenario 2.  A storage rack should be 
designed that consists of fixed positions for the canisters, thereby fixing the 
geometry as well as the distance between individual canisters. 
In addition it is recommended that the exact storage configuration be modelled 
upon completion of the design of the facility. 
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